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Abstract 
This paper examines how fiscal decentralization may influence economic growth. Previous research on this question 
has primarily focused on the potential direct relationship between decentralization and growth. In this paper, we also 
examine the potential indirect influence of decentralization on growth through its impact on macroeconomic stabil­
ity. We find that decentralization may positively influence price stability in developed countries, though this impact 
is much less clear in developing and transitional countries. We also find some evidence suggesting that decentraliza­
tion may directly and negatively affect economic growth in higher-income countries but that this effect is reduced 
through the indirect positive impact of decentralization on growth through macroeconomic stability. 
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1. Introduction 
Given the current drive among developing and transitional countries to decentralize ex­
penditures and revenues to subnational governments, it is important to ask not only whether 
fiscal decentralization influences economic growth, but also how fiscal decentralization may 
influence economic growth. What evidence exists on the direct relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and economic growth is conflicting at best and lacks, for the most part, a 
convincing argument in either direction on the direct effect of fiscal decentralization. The 
same may be said for the theoretical development and empirical evidence on the relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and macroeconomic stability. 
In this paper we examine the current state of knowledge in the economics literature on 
the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth; investigate empiri­
cally the extent of such a relationship; and analyze whether fiscal decentralization also indi­
rectly influences economic growth through its impact on macroeconomic stability. As de­
centralization moves to the forefront of policy options being considered by developing and 
* We would like to thank Kelly Edmiston and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. Jorge 
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transitional countries and often figures prominently among the prescriptions offered by inter­
national donor organizations, it becomes more important to understand better the relation­
ship between decentralization, macroeconomic stability, and economic growth. If fiscal de­
centralization positively or negatively influences economic growth directly or indirectly (the 
latter though the macroeconomic stability channel), then policymakers need to be aware of 
these relationships when formulating and implementing decentralization policy. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we briefly review the literature on the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization, macroeconomic stability, and economic growth. 
Second, we develop an augmented neoclassical model of economic growth that incorporates 
both the potential indirect effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth through mac­
roeconomic stability and the potential direct effect of fiscal decentralization on economic 
growth. Third, using an international panel data set, we estimate the impact of fiscal decen­
tralization on macroeconomic stability and economic growth. The last section summarizes 
and reviews the policy implications of our findings. 
2. Review of the Literature 
While the direct relationship between decentralization and growth is not one of the con­
ventionally addressed issues in the theory of fiscal federalism, it has received a significant 
amount of attention in the empirical literature in recent years 1. Whether or not a direct rela­
tionship exists between fiscal decentralization and economic growth, however, remains, an 
unanswered question 2. The static proposition that fiscal decentralization enhances economic 
efficiency may have a corresponding effect in the dynamic setting of economic growth 
(Oates 1993). Of course, this linkage can be derailed if fiscal decentralization does not func­
tion effectively 3. Others have argued that decentralization may control the Leviathan, al­
though the evidence on this hypothesis is also mixed 4. Some have argued that decentraliza­
tion may also serve to preserve and promote the development of markets (Weingast 1995, 
Qian and Weingast 1997, Cao, Qian and Weingast 1999). A problem, however, is that these 
arguments for decentralization may be susceptible to the contention that subnational govern­
ments in developing and transitional economies lack sufficient capacity relative to the cen­
tral government (Rodden and Rose-Ackerman 1997). 
Nevertheless, most authors arguing for and against using fiscal decentralization as a pol­
icy option in developing and transitional economies have implicitly recognized the potential 
influence of fiscal decentralization on macroeconomic stability (Prud’homme 1995, McLure 
1995, Sewell 1996, Fornasari, Webb, and Zou 2000, Tanzi 2000). The theory of design of 
fiscal decentralization suggests a number of potential tradeoffs between efficiency and other 
objectives such as a more equal distribution of resources across regions or macroeconomic 
stability. The classical view of this issue contends that macroeconomic policy should solely 
be the responsibility of the central government and not at all the responsibility of subnational 
governments, more recently, a number of authors have argued that devolving at least some 
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measure of macroeconomic policy to subnational governments can promote, not hinder, 
macroeconomic stability (Gramlich 1995, Shah 1999, Rodden and Wibbels 2002). 
On the negative side, some have argued that the apparent disregard of some subnational 
governments for budget constraints in decentralized systems suggests that fiscal decentral­
ization per se aggravates macroeconomic instability or at least presents another obstacle to 
resolving chronic fiscal imbalance (Rodden 2002 and Rodden, Eskeland and Litvack 2003). 
Where macroeconomic instability predated decentralization, for example, in Argentina and 
Brazil, decentralization has made the solutions more complicated in general but not impossi­
ble (Dillinger, Perry and Webb 2000). However, in many countries, the presence of a 
soft-budget constraint at the local level of government remains a threat to macroeconomic 
stability (Bahl 1999 and Stein 1999). 
The empirical evidence on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and macro­
economic stability does not provide any definitive conclusion on the direction or signifi­
cance of the relationship. Lagged inflation does not appear to significantly influence govern­
ment size but it does appear that decentralization affects government size (Jin and Zou 
2002). There also appears to be an almost 1-to-1 correspondence between increases in 
subnational deficits and central government expenditures and deficits in the subsequent pe­
riod (Fornasari, Webb and Zou 2000). On the other hand, others have argued that no clear re­
lationship appears to exist between decentralization and the level of inflation (Treisman 
2000 and Rodden and Wibbels 2002). In summary, with the influence of fiscal decentraliza­
tion on economic growth, whether decentralization significantly influences macroeconomic 
stability still is an unanswered question. 
3.	 A Model of Decentralization, Macroeconomic Stability, 
and Growth 
Our objectives in this section are first to account for the direct relationship between fis­
cal decentralization and economic growth; and second, to incorporate the potential influence 
of fiscal decentralization on macroeconomic stability into the aggregate production function; 
and therefore examine the indirect influence of decentralization on growth through its impact 
on macroeconomic stability. While the direct relationship between fiscal decentralization 
and economic growth has been previously examined in the literature, the indirect influence 
of fiscal decentralization on growth through macroeconomic stability has not been previ­
ously studied. 
We develop an augmented neoclassical model of economic growth, which includes, 
among other variables, the accumulation of human and physical capital, to examine the role 
played by fiscal decentralization 5. We extend the model by assuming that the standard term 
for technological progress can be disaggregated into exogenous technical progress, the direct 
effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, and the effect of decentralization on 
macroeconomic stability. By augmenting the model, we can explicitly examine how decen­
tralization may indirectly influence economic growth through its impact on macroeconomic 
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stability. We note that the disaggregation of the exogenous technical progress term is consis­
tent with the literature and adheres to the conditional convergence hypothesis (Barro 1991, 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992, 1997). 
We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function for the entire economy for country i at 
time t is given by (Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992 and Islam 1995) 
f <Yit =V Kit aG H Le it it it it [1] 
where a, f, <, e > 0 and a + f + < + e ; 1. Y is the level of output and V is the level of tech­
nology and other institutional factors. We define K, G and H as the stocks of private, public, 
and capital while L is the stock of labor. We further specify V as the product of exogenous 
technical progress (A), decentralization (D), and macroeconomic stability (MS) or  
Vit = AitDitMSit [2] 
We note that D is synonymous with the direct effect of fiscal decentralization on output. 
If fiscal decentralization indirectly influences output through its impact on inflation, ceteris 
paribus, then it will indirectly influence economic output through MS. We note that 
disaggregating exogenous technological progress should not be interpreted as inflation or de­
centralization affecting economic growth through technological progress. If one expands the 
theoretical model, it becomes apparent that macroeconomic stability, decentralization, and 
technological progress affect the physical inputs separately, that is, technological progress is 
not a composite function of decentralization. 
We further assume that L and A grow exogenously at rates n and g, respectively, and that 
capital depreciates at the uniform rate 8 6. We define the level of macroeconomic stability as 
a function of, among other things, fiscal decentralization or 
MS it = g D( it , X 1 it ) [3] 
where X1 is a vector of other exogenous variables explaining the behavior of macrostability 
over time. At this time, for theoretical simplicity, we assume that decentralization is 
uncorrelated with the vector of exogenous variables X1. 
We further assume that output is subject to decreasing returns to scale with respect to 
physical and human capital. This implies that the economy, over the long-run, will tend to 
constant private capital-labor, human capital-labor, and public capital-labor ratios 7. Once 
steady state output is achieved, additional increases in per capita output can only be achieved 
through increases in capital productivity or increases in the level of decentralization (assum­
ing that the overall effect of decentralization on economic growth is positive) 8. Decentral­
ization may thus affect output through two channels, a potential direct effect on output, and a 
series of potential indirect effects, one of which is macrostability 9. 
To determine the influence of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, we must first 
determine the steady state levels of the physical inputs in the production function. We as­
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sume that the same production function applies to all forms of reproducible capital and con­
sumption so that one unit of capital can be costlessly transformed into one unit of consump­
tion and vice versa. Assuming decreasing marginal returns to all forms of reproducible 
capital; that no combination of capital inputs exhibits constant marginal returns; expanding V 
and taking the natural logarithm yields from (1) and (2) the steady state level of output per 
unit of labor (y *), or 
a 
f gy * kln it = ln Ait + ln Dit + ln MS it + ln iit + ln iit1- - - 1- - -a f <  a f <  
< + +h a f <
+ ln i - ln(n g <+ + )
1- - - it 1- - -a f <  a f <  [4] 
where ik, ig, and ih are the fractions of output invested in private, public, and human capital, 
respectively. Thus, the steady state output is dependent upon the accumulation of reproduc­
ible capital, the stock of technology, the direct effect of decentralization on output, and the 
indirect effect of decentralization through the macrostability channel. 
We can calculate the speed of convergence to steady state per capita output using 
d ln y it *
=  (ln y it - ln y it )
dt [5] 
where  = (n + g + 8)(1 – a – f – <). The evolution of per capita output over time is given by 
at kln = ln y - ln y (1 e - )[ln D + ln MS + ln iiity it it it -1 = -
 
it it 
1- -a f - <  
f < h a f <+ +
+ ln i g + ln i - ln(n + +g 8)it it
a f <  a f < - - -1- - - 1- - - 1 a f <  
0 - t 0 - t 0 - t 0
- ln y i - e ln Ai - e ln Di - e MS i ] [6] 
where y0, A0, D0, and MS0 are the initial levels of per capita output, exogenous technical 
progress, decentralization, and macroeconomic stability, respectively. 
The advantage of this theoretical specification over the ones used in previous papers is 
that it allows for the explicit examination of the out-of-steady-state dynamics. In addition, 
our theoretical specification also makes explicit the difference between the bounded institu­
tional factors in the production function and the physical inputs in the production function. 
The bounded institutional factors directly influence economic growth while the physical in­
puts are weighted by the ratio of their output share to labor’s share of output. Finally, our the­
oretical specification explicitly captures the unobservable initial conditions in the theoretical 
model, providing support for our error components estimation approach below. Empirically, 
equation (6) suggests that decentralization may affect output through multiple channels: di­
rectly as previously suggested and tested in the literature, and indirectly through its influence 
on the physical inputs in the production function and through the macro-stability channel. 
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Two empirical hypotheses thus result from our theoretical analysis: (1) fiscal decentraliza­
tion directly affects the evolution of per capita output over time; and (2) fiscal decentraliza­
tion affects macroeconomic stability which, in turn, affects the evolution of per capita output 
over time. 
Two problems may arise with our derivation of the steady state production function and 
the equation for the convergence to the steady state output level. First, if countries have per­
manent differences in technology, then these differences would enter as part of the error term 
and be positively correlated with initial per capita output. Permanent variations in technol­
ogy could bias the estimated coefficient on initial per capita output toward zero. However, 
the literature has yet to find convincing evidence to support the contention that countries 
have permanent differences in technology. Second, while countries may not have permanent 
variations in technology, they may have permanent variations in their institutional factors 
(colonial legacy, legal system, climate, geographical region) that would also enter as part of 
the error term. To control for these institutional factors, we employ a two-way error compo­
nents model in our empirical estimations. 
4. Empirical Estimation: The Impact of Fiscal Decentralization 
We now turn to the task of determining whether empirical support exists for the hypoth­
eses of the direct and indirect effects of fiscal decentralization on economic growth. As in the 
case of several more recent studies of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
economic growth, we employ a panel data set of developed and developing countries. We 
first discuss the data sources and methodology before presenting the results of our empirical 
investigations. 
4.1. The Measurement of Fiscal Decentralization 
The most serious difficulty we face in the cross-country study of fiscal decentralization 
is how to properly measure the extent of decentralization. Ideally, we would be able to con­
struct a panel data set of measures of fiscal decentralization that effectively quantified the ac­
tivities of subnational governments resulting from autonomous or independent decisions of 
subnational governments. This would require classifying those revenues and expenditures 
that are under the effective control of the central government as central government activi­
ties, regardless of the level of government at which these revenues or expenditures occurred. 
Likewise, activities that were under the control of subnational governments, even if they 
were funded by the central government, would be classified as subnational government ac­
tivities. Constructing such a panel data set would require information on: (i) the nature of 
grants and transfers received by subnational governments (for example, lump-sum versus 
conditional); (ii) the structure of the tax system to determine whether and how revenues were 
shared; (iii) the discretion of subnational governments to levy and collect taxes and to 
change their bases and rates; (iv) the discretion granted to subnational governments to spend 
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resources to meet the needs of their constituents; and (v) the overall level of political auton­
omy of subnational governments. 
Unfortunately, we cannot readily address these issues with the available data. As with 
many other empirical studies of fiscal decentralization, we employ the International Mone­
tary Fund’s Government Finance Statistics Annual Yearbook (GFS) as the primary data 
source for revenues and expenditures of national and subnational governments. While the 
GFS system reports information on grants and transfers between the various levels of gov­
ernment, it does not contain information on whether the grants and transfers are under the 
control of the central or recipient level of government or if the grants are conditional, block, 
or lump-sum. The GFS system also does not report information on the nature of transfers. 
Cross-sectional and time-series data on the number and size of subnational governments is 
sketchy at best for developed countries and virtually non-existent for developing and transi­
tional countries, except in those cases where technical assistance providers have conducted 
surveys of subnational governments. 
It is this lack of information that has led to the use of a measure of fiscal decentralization 
that is typically constructed as a ratio of subnational government expenditures (revenues) to 
general government expenditures (revenues). We are, as Oates (1972) concluded, left with 
the standard, albeit imperfect, measures of fiscal decentralization based on revenue and ex­
penditure data. We, as many of the other studies that have preceded us, thus define fiscal de­
centralization in one dimension, that is, as the share of subnational government revenues to 
general government revenues or the share of subnational government expenditures to general 
government expenditures 10. 
In our analysis, specifically, we use GFS data at the consolidated central government, re­
gional and state government, and local government levels. For those countries that do not re­
port consolidated central government data, we substitute data on the budgetary central gov­
ernment 11. Of the 180-plus potential countries in the GFS data set, we selected those 
countries that reported revenues and expenditures for at least the central government and at 
least one level of subnational government 12. This selection process resulted in an unbal­
anced base panel data set of 1491 observations for 66 developed and developing countries 
with observations ranging from 1972 to 2003. We then calculated two measures of fiscal de­
centralization: (1) the ratio of total subnational government revenues to general government 
revenues and (2) the ratio of total subnational government expenditures to general govern­
ment expenditures. These two measures are the standard measures of fiscal decentralization 
that have been widely used in the previous studies of determinants and outcomes of fiscal de­
centralization 13. 
4.2. Other Variables of Interest 
We then construct an unbalanced panel data of socio-economic variables set that is 
drawn from three other sources: the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, the 
United States Census Bureau’s International Data Base, Freedom House’s Survey of Free­
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dom, the Armed Conflict database. As these databases are well known in the literature, we 
focus on the construction of the variables of interest for this paper. 
We would prefer to measure the evolution of human capital across countries and time 
using schooling data; however, panel data on education levels are currently not of sufficient 
quantity to include in the panel data set. Most panel datasets of education data are con­
structed on a five-year not annual basis 14. As a substitute, we use infant mortality as a proxy 
for the evolution of human capital. We readily acknowledge that this is an imperfect measure 
(as are all measures of human capital). 
To test the hypotheses that fiscal decentralization significantly influences macroeco­
nomic stability, we use the annual change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI), more com­
monly know as the inflation rate, as the measure of macroeconomic stability. We would pre­
fer to use a composite index equal to the sum of the unemployment rate and the inflation rate 
as the measure of macroeconomic stability. As with measures of school enrollment, mea-
sures of unemployment are not readily available for the early periods in the sample. While 
unemployment data could be obtained directly from the countries in the sample, problems of 
consistency and comparability across countries and time prohibit the use of the data. 
When we combine the data extracted from the GFS with the data extracted from the 
other data sources, the size of the data set is reduced from 1491 observations to 1211 obser­
vations due to missing observations in the socio-economic data sets. We note again that the 
panel data set is unbalanced; we do not create linear approximations of the missing data 
points; nor do we construct averages over periods of time to balance the data set 15. While we 
acknowledge that gaps exist in our dataset, we explicitly choose to retain data rather than cull 
the gaps from our dataset to achieve a more tractable panel. Our approach is to examine the 
potential impact of decentralization in the full sample of countries using variants of the 
two-way error components model 16. We then split the sample into sub-samples of devel­
oped and developing and transitional countries to investigate whether the influence of decen­
tralization is dependent upon the level of development. These estimations allow us to test the 
hypotheses presented in the theoretical model. 
4.3. Fiscal Decentralization and Macroeconomic Stability 
Equation (6) suggests that fiscal decentralization indirectly influences economic growth 
through its impact on macroeconomic stability. We recognize, however, that economic 
growth, in turn, may influence macroeconomic stability and fiscal decentralization. We at­
tempt to disentangle these relationships by first empirically exploring whether fiscal decen­
tralization affects macroeconomic stability. We address the question of simultaneity in the 
next section. 
We follow Treisman (2000) in the specification of our empirical model in that the annual 
rate of inflation is determined by, among other things, fiscal decentralization, the develop­
ment of the tax system, the level of economic development, and the openness of the econ­
omy. We also include measures of the subnational and central government deficits to GDP as 
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this has been hypothesized in the literature to be positively correlated with inflation. Unlike 
Treisman (2000) and others, however, we do not include time or country-invariant dummy 
variables that, in essence, capture the fixed differences across states and time. Variables such 
as ethno linguistic fractionalization, type of parliamentary system, colonial power, revolu­
tions and coups per decade, and other variables are «swept out» by the Within transformation 
of the fixed effects errors components estimator. 
Following the theoretical specification and Treisman (2000), our base two-way error 
components model is thus: 
YitPit = f1 Dit + f2Tax it + f3 + f4 Openit + 8Z it + uit
Popit [7] 
where P is the annual change in the consumer price index, D is the measure of fiscal decen­
tralization discussed above, tax is the measure of tax revenue to GDP, Y/Pop is GDP per ca-
pita, Open is the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, and the Z matrix contains additional 
control variables to include, population, urbanization, defense expenditures as a percentage 
of GDP, indicators of armed conflict, and measures of democratic governance. 
Testing for the presence of endogeneity of fiscal decentralization in (7) 17, we fail to re­
ject the null hypothesis of exogeneity for fiscal decentralization with respect to the inflation 
rate 18. While we recognize that the tests for endogeneity with unbalanced panel data may be 
of relatively low power, our failure to reject to null hypothesis of exogeneity for decentral­
ization is consistent with the rest of the decentralization literature. 
We then examine whether the random effects GLS estimator or fixed effects Within esti­
mator is more appropriate for the estimation of (7). While we would prefer to use the random 
effects estimator to avoid the loss of degrees of freedom associated with the use of the 
Within estimator, we reject the null hypothesis that the regressors and effects are 
uncorrelated 19. As this result suggests that the random effects estimator is inconsistent, we 
use the fixed effects estimator for the estimation of the relationship between fiscal decentral­
ization and inflation. Finally, we examine whether the fixed effects are jointly significant, 
that is, whether the time and country specific effects are significant. Using these results, we 
specify the estimable form of Equation (7) as a two-way fixed effects model. In each step, we 
test whether serial correlation is present using a modified Durbin-Watson test 20. We unam­
biguously reject the null hypothesis of serial correlation at the 1% significance level for the 
initial model in levels. To correct for serial correlation, we employ the Prais-Winsten Panel 
Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) Within estimator, the Within estimator with an 
autoregressive order 1 error process, and finally, we examine the Within estimator using first 
differenced data. We believe that this approach is appropriate to examine whether our results 
are robust to alternative specifications. 
From this paper’s perspective, the evidence is mixed in the full sample whether fiscal de­
centralization influences inflation (Table 1). Decentralization (expenditure and revenue) ap­
pears to negatively influence inflation in the PCSE, Within Instrumental Variable (IV), and 
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first differenced Within IV estimations. We must note, however, that our choice of instruments 
is quite limited given the span of our sample, thus the estimated coefficients in the IV estima­
tions should be viewed with caution. The results suggest that, in the full sample of countries, 
that decentralization may be associated with lower rates of inflation, although we must admit 
the affect is quite small in magnitude. For the PCSE estimations, for example, a 1% increase in 
the level of expenditure decentralization would appear to induce a 0.6% decrease in the pre­
vailing rate of inflation. The estimated coefficients appear to be robust to the inclusion of other 
regressors, including total population, freedom status, globalization status, and urbanization. 
We again caution that our results are limited to the countries and time periods covered in our 
sample and subject to the limitations of our measures of fiscal decentralization. 
Turning to the sub-sample estimations, we find contrasting evidence on the impact of 
fiscal decentralization. For the sub-sample of developed countries, the Within AR(1) and 
Within IV estimations suggest that decentralization may be associated with lower rates of in­
flation. The estimated coefficients resulting from the PCSE estimations, however, are not 
statistically significant, suggesting that these results are not robust to alternative specifica­
tions. These results suggest that the sample countries that are relatively more decentralized 
experience relatively lower rates of inflation. 
For the sub-sample of developing and transitional countries, the results run counter to 
those of the full and sub-sample of developed countries. The estimated coefficients for fiscal 
decentralization are positive and statistically significant for the Within (uncorrected for se­
rial correlation), Within AR(1), and first differenced Within IV estimations. The estimated 
coefficients for the PCSE estimations are either statistically significant at 15% (expenditure 
decentralization) or 10% (revenue decentralization). These results suggest, albeit subject to 
the caveats noted above, that decentralization may be associated with higher rates of infla­
tion for the developing and transitional countries in the sample. While the explanatory power 
of the estimations is small, the results are intriguing. 
The results of our analysis, even in light of the necessary cautionary notes, are quite in­
triguing. Expenditure decentralization appears to promote price stability among the devel­
oped countries in the sample. On the other hand, decentralization may undermine price sta­
bility in the sub-sample of developing and transitional countries. We must recognize that our 
results are not robust across all estimators, suggesting that the estimated coefficients are 
fragile to alternative specifications and estimators. 
Our empirical results appear support the previous arguments in the literature that fiscal de­
centralization may enhance price stability and the a priori arguments of those who caution that 
decentralization, at a minimum, presents an obstacle to achieving macroeconomic stability 
(Prud’homme 1995). With respect to the empirical literature, our findings contradict the previ­
ous findings that decentralization either «locks in» (Treisman 2000) the current rate of inflation 
or has no statistically discernable effect (Rodden and Wibbels 2002). Our results appear to 
suggest that decentralization may be more beneficial for higher-income countries, although 
such a conclusion is subject to the countries and time periods covered in the sample. 
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4.4. Decentralization, Macrostability, and Economic Growth 
We now turn to the question of the effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, 
that is, whether the static proposition that fiscal decentralization is efficiency enhancing has 
a corresponding proposition in the dynamic setting of economic growth. The theoretical 
model suggests that a direct relationship between decentralization and economic growth is 
possible, yet the question remains whether the relationship can be empirically substantiated 
in a fully specified model that controls, among other things, for the indirect effect of fiscal 
decentralization on economic growth. We now examine whether fiscal decentralization di­
rectly affects economic growth and also whether there is an indirect impact on economic 
growth through the inflation channel. 
Drawing on the neoclassical economic growth literature, we specify the base estimation 
equation for growth in per capita GDP as: 
y k h  it = f1 Dit + f2 iit + f3 iit + f4 Pit + 8  Z it + uit [8] 
where D and P are as previously discussed. The fraction of output invested in capital (ik) is  
proxied by the ratio of gross domestic savings to GDP 21. The fraction of output invested in 
human capital (ih) proxied by infant mortality. The Z matrix contains a number of control 
regressors, including openness to international trade, population, democratic governance, tax 
revenues as a percentage of GDP, and armed conflict. 
Following the methodology presented in the previous subsection, we first test for the 
endogeneity of the regressors 22. We fail to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity for fiscal 
decentralization with respect to growth in per capita GDP, a result that supports the previous 
findings in the literature. We do, however, reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity for the in­
flation rate. We again reject the null hypothesis that the regressors and effects are uncorrelated, 
suggesting that the fixed effects estimator is more appropriate for the task of estimating (8). 
We also reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at the 1 percent significance level. 
Our measure of human capital is insignificant, regardless of specification or sample 
taken. We suspect that this is due to the imperfect means by which we measure human capi­
tal. Our choice is thus to either estimate using 5-year averages so we could include other 
measures (schooling) of human capital or to exclude this variable from the estimations. 
Given the criticisms in the literature as to the quality of human capital and the potential for 
bias, we excluded infant mortality from our final estimations. If there is any discernable im­
pact, the fixed effects would capture this unobservable influence. 
The empirical results are presented in Tables 4-6. Among the most important empirical 
findings of this paper is the failure to detect, for the full sample of countries, a consistent sta­
tistically significant direct relationship between fiscal decentralization and growth in per ca-
pita GDP. While the estimated coefficient for expenditure decentralization is negative, it 
does not approach any meaningful level of significance in those estimations in which we 
control for serial correlation. The estimated coefficient for revenue decentralization is also 
negative but insignificant in the majority of estimations. The inclusion of the control 
39 Fiscal decentralization, macrostability, and growth 
regressors, to include total population, defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP, open­
ness to international trade, armed conflict, and democratic governance, does not improve the 
significance of either of the estimated coefficients for fiscal decentralization. We also exam­
ined whether a non-monotonic relationship exists between decentralization and growth by 
including the square of decentralization as an additional variable. The estimated coefficients 
for the squared decentralization terms were also insignificant. Our findings appear to support 
those in the literature who have failed to detect a statistically significant direct relationship 
between decentralization and economic growth. 
While we fail to observe evidence of a direct relationship between decentralization and 
growth, we find empirical support for an indirect relationship between decentralization and 
growth through the inflation channel. As noted in the previous section, expenditure decen­
tralization appears to reduce the rate of inflation in the developed countries in the sample. 
The results in this section verify that a negative relationship exists between inflation and eco­
nomic growth for developed countries. Thus, an increase in expenditure decentralization, all 
else being equal, would appear to reduce the rate of inflation over time and, in turn, indi­
rectly enhance economic growth. The empirical evidence also suggests that, subject to the 
above caveats on the sample and estimation methodologies, that decentralization may retard 
economic growth through the inflation channel for the developing and transitional countries 
in the sample. We believe that this first evidence on the indirect influence of decentralization 
on growth is intriguing as it supports the contention that decentralization has an indirect ef­
fect on economic growth through its impact on inflation. 
For the sub-sample of developed countries, we note that there appears to be a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between fiscal decentralization and growth in per capita 
GDP for the Within PCSE and Within AR(1) estimations. The estimated coefficients for ex­
penditure and revenue decentralization are statistically significant at the 1 and 10 percent level, 
respectively. While the estimated coefficients for revenue decentralization are fragile and not 
statistically significant, the estimated coefficients for expenditure decentralization appear ro­
bust to alternative specifications, given our limited number of available control regressors. For 
the developed countries sub-sample, increases in expenditure decentralization appear to lower 
economic growth, although the same decentralization measure lowers the rate of inflation, 
which in turns, increases economic growth. This is an important result in that it suggests trade­
offs exist when considering decentralization for higher-income countries. 
As with the full sample estimations, we fail to detect a statistically significant direct rela­
tionship between fiscal decentralization and growth in per capita GDP for the majority of es­
timations. After controlling for serial correlation, decentralization is negative and statisti­
cally significant at the 5% level for only the Within AR(1) estimations. This suggests that, 
for the sample countries, that the significance of the estimated coefficient is fragile to alter­
native specifications. As with the full sample of countries, we note that inflation appears to 
significantly and negatively influence growth in per capita GDP. This result would appear to 
suggest that decentralization, for the developing countries in the sample, may indirectly af­
fect economic growth through the inflation channel, although this conclusion is not as strong 
as with the developed country sub-sample. 
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43 Fiscal decentralization, macrostability, and growth 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper we have examined the linkages between fiscal decentralization, inflation, 
and economic growth and have found support for the hypothesis that decentralization may 
promote price stability in higher-income countries and detract from price-stability in devel­
oping and transitional countries. While it is quite clear that poorly designed or implemented 
fiscal decentralization policies may create incentives for subnational governments to 
over-borrow relative to their debt-servicing capacity and potentially lead to macroeconomic 
instability, it appears that, by allowing governments at different levels to mobilize their own 
revenues, decentralization ultimately leads to more stable prices in higher-income countries. 
The mechanism by which this takes place is not well established and it should be investi­
gated in the future. However, an appealing conjecture is that by mobilizing their own tax rev­
enues, local governments put less pressure on the central government budgeting, thus lower­
ing the chances for larger central government deficits and ultimately increases in the money 
supply and inflation. We must also note that this logic may not be as straightforward in de­
veloping and transitional countries, though we caution that our results are limited to the 
countries and time periods in our sample. 
The other significant finding of this paper is that we find no evidence supporting the ex­
istence of a direct role for fiscal decentralization in economic growth in the full sample of 
countries. However, fiscal decentralization appears to directly lower the rate of growth in the 
sample of developed countries, although this effect is offset to some degree by decentraliza­
tion’s positive indirect influence through the inflation channel. For developing countries, the 
evidence is not as clear as to whether decentralization directly influences economic growth, 
though it does appear that decentralization may retard economic growth through the inflation 
channel. 
From the perspective of future research, refining the measures of fiscal decentralization 
and macroeconomic stability to include measures of unemployment and other dimensions 
should be the next step of future work. A more complete understanding of the contemporane­
ous and time-wise causality flows between decentralization, its influences, and economic 
growth, should also be considered avenues for future research. 
Notes 
(1) Considerable attention has also been paid to the determinants of fiscal decentralization. For reviews of this li­
terature, see, among others, Oates (1999), Panizza (1999), and Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003). 
(2) See, for example, Xie, Zou, and Davoodi (1999), Zhang and Zou (1998), Lin and Liu (2000), and Thiessen 
(2003) for empirical analyses of the relationship between between fiscal decentralization and economic 
growth. 
(3) Bahl and Linn (1992), Prud’homme (1995), Tanzi (1996), and Bahl (1999) have questioned whether or not vo­
ting mechanisms and mobility function well enough in developing economies to allow the realization of effi­
ciency gains associated with decentralization. 
(4) Marlow (1988) argues that decentralization is negatively associated with government size; Anderson and Van 
den Berg (1998) fail to detect a statistically significant relationship between decentralization and government 
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size; Stein (1999) argues that decentralization’s may reduce or increase government size, dependent upon the 
extent of vertical imbalance; Jin and Zou (2002) and Rodden (2003) find that expenditure decentralization and 
smaller vertical imbalance control government size. 
(5) Decentralization is typically measured by the ratio of total subnational government expenditures (revenues) to 
total government expenditures (revenues) and this measure is bounded between zero and one. 
(6) We follow Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) in assuming that the rate of depreciation is uniform across all 
types of reproducible capital for theoretical simplicity. See Lucas (1988) and Tondl (1999) for alternative ap­
proaches to the question of depreciation. 
(7) The growth model specified in Equation 1 can be either a Solow-augmented neoclassical growth model with 
constant returns to scale for all production factors or an endogenous growth model with increasing returns to 
scale for all production factors. Also, if any combination of the capital inputs exhibits constant returns to scale 
then (1) would similarly be characterized as an endogenous growth model. Senhadji (1999) notes that a large 
part of the empirical growth literature supports the assumption of decreasing returns to capital. 
(8) While changes in resource endowments (the discovery of new resources or new developments such as a cure 
for AIDS) may affect short-term capital-labor ratios, these changes would not necessarily affect the steady sta­
te capital-labor ratio unless these changes influence capital productivity. 
(9) Policies that lead to a permanent increase in the steady state capital-labor ratio cannot lead to long-run per ca-
pita growth, unless A is steadily increasing. Since the convergence to the new steady state may take years to 
occur, fiscal policy can still lead to higher output growth rates for a significant period of time, even though the 
neoclassical model might imply that these policies would affect only the level of output and not its long-run 
growth rate (Gerson 1998). 
(10) See Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) for a discussion of the pitfalls associated with the conventional measurement of 
fiscal decentralization. The OECD dataset suggested by Ebel and Yilmaz, however, includes only data for six 
countries on a period of only three years (1997-1999). Stegarescu (2004) measures of decentralization only fo­
cus on OECD members. 
(11) This is consistent with previous examinations of fiscal decentralization in the literature. 
(12) We did not include those countries that stopped reporting revenue and expenditure information prior to 1990 
and those countries whose reported data were mathematically inconsistent. We did include countries that re­
ported zero or minimal expenditures or revenues for at least one subnational level of government. 
(13) While some studies of fiscal decentralization have attempted to construct measures of decentralization net of 
grants and transfers and net of certain types of expenditures, we do not construct such measures, as we are not 
able to ascertain, with any degree of certainty, whether these techniques reduce or enhance the bias already 
present in our measures of fiscal decentralization. See, for example, Woller and Phillips (1998) and Lin and 
Liu (2000). 
(14) De la Fuente and Domenech (2000) and Levine and Renelt (1992) note that poor measurement and data qua­
lity casts suspicion on the estimated coefficients for human capital variables in growth equations. 
(15) A linear approximation, which may merely reflect the time-wise average of the series around the missing data 
points, is likely to obscure the variability in the series that may arise, in part, due to the influence of fiscal de­
centralization. Linear approximation may also introduce bias into the series depending upon which observa­
tions are used to create the approximations for the missing data points. It is entirely possible that the observa­
tions may reflect a period in time in which the structure of the economy is significantly different from other 
periods in time (during an oil or policy shock, for example). 
(16) See Baltagi (2001) for a discussion of the two-way fixed effects error component estimator. 
(17) See, among others, Hausman (1978), Hausman and Taylor (1981), and Wooldrige (2002) for a discussion of 
testing for endogeneity in the presence of an unbalanced panel data set. 
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(18) We also fail to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity for openness to international trade, tax revenues as a 
percentage of GDP, population growth, and Gross Domestic Savings as a percentage of GDP. The test statis­
tics are available upon request. 
(19) We employ Breusch and Pagan’s Lagrangian Multiplier test and reject the null hypothesis of no correlation at 
the 1% level. 
(20) When specified in levels, the modified Durbin-Watson test statistic for unbalanced panel data is 0.971 while 
the Baltagi-Wu LBI statistic is 1.596, both rejecting the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at the 1% level. 
(21) We would prefer to examine the disaggregated impact of public and private capital, however, the World Bank 
no longer maintains the gross domestic fixed investment data series for all the countries in the sample and thus 
we are no longer able to construct the series of interest. We are left with gross domestic savings as a percenta­
ge of GDP as a proxy for capital. 
(22) The test statistics are available upon request. 
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Variable Appendix 
Variable Definition and Source 
Revenue Decentralization Ratio of total subnational government revenues, inclu­
ding grants and transfers, to the sum of government re­
venues at the subnational and central government level 
Government Finance Statistics 
Expenditure Decentralization Ratio of total subnational government expenditures, in­
cluding grants and transfers, to the sum of government 
expenditures at the subnational and central government 
level 
Government Finance Statistics 
Subnational Deficit as % of GDP Authors’ Calculations 
Central Government Deficit as % of GDP Authors’ Calculations 
Gross Domestic Product Per Capita in 
Constant 2000 U.S. Dollars 
World Development Indicators (2005) 
Tax Revenues as Percentage of GDP Authors’ Calculations 
Openness to International Trade 
(Exports + Imports as % of GDP) World Development Indicators (2005) 
Armed Conflict Armed Conflict 1946-2004 
Gross Domestic Savings as % of GDP World Development Indicators (2005) 
Infant Mortality per 1,000 live births International Data Base (2005) 
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Sample Countries 
Country Observation Period Country Observation Period 
Albania 1995-1998 Argentina 1978-2001 
Australia 1972-2002 Austria 1972-1997, 2000-2002 
Azerbaijan 1994-1999 Belarus 1992-2000 
Belgium 1978-2002 Bolivia 1986-2003 
Brazil 1980-1998 Bulgaria 1988-2003 
Canada 1974-2002 Chile 1974-1988, 1992-2003 
Costa Rica 1972-1996 Croatia 1994-2001 
Czech Republic 1993-2003 Denmark 1977-2003 
Dominican Republic 1972-1996 Estonia 1992-2001 
Fiji 1974-1993 Finland 1972-2003 
France 1972-2002 Georgia 1997-2001 
Germany 1972-2003 Hungary 1981-2002 
Iceland 1972-2002 India 1974-1999 
Indonesia 1975-1998 Ireland 1972-1997 
Israel 1974-2002 Italy 1995-2000 
Kazakhstan 1997-2003 Kenya 1972-1994 
Kyrgyz Republic 1995-2001 Latvia 1994-2003 
Lithuania 1991,1993-2003 Luxembourg 1972-2003 
Malaysia 1972,1985,1991-2003 Mauritius 1980-1999,2002-2003 
Mexico 1972-2000 Moldova 1995-2003 
Mongolia 1992-2003 Netherlands 1975-1997, 1999-2002 
New Zealand 1992-2002 Norway 1972-2003 
Panama 1980-1994 Paraguay 1973-1980, 1984-1993 
Peru 1990-2003 Philippines 1978-1992 
Poland 1994-2002 Portugal 1975-1976, 1987-2001 
Romania 1990-2001 Russia 1994-1995, 1998-2003 
Slovak Republic 1996-2003 Slovenia 1992-2003 
South Africa 1977-2003 Spain 1972-2002 
Sweden 1972-2002 Switzerland 1972-1984, 1991-2001 
Tajikistan 1998-2001 Thailand 1972-2003 
Ukraine 1999-2001 United Kingdom 1974-2003 
United States 1972-2001 Zimbabwe 1976-1991 

